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1 Do handicaps always cause failure? 
As the previous Chapter very clearly demonstrates, members of all of Britain’s visible minorities 
still routinely find themselves exposed to various forms of racial exclusionism; and since such 
exclusion most frequently occurs – and also bites most deeply – in situations where they are 
competing with members of the indigenous majority for access to scarce to scarce resources of one 
kind or another, they are inevitably disadvantaged as a result. However it is one thing to observe 
that a members of a certain social category have been treated in a disadvantageous fashion by 
having a wholly unjustified handicap imposed upon them, and quite another to conclude that they 
will therefore, of necessity, finish last in every race. On the contrary there is always a very real 
possibility that despite being subjected to such a disadvantage, the handicapped will develop all 
manner of skills and strategies with which to resist and circumvent its consequences, so much so 
that they may ultimately perform as well as, and sometimes even more successfully than, their 
myopically self-interested excluders.  
 
It is also worth remembering that such achievements cannot be taken as evidence that the 
handicapping process itself does not exist. Far from it. Instead they are much better understood as 
an indication of the extent to which the otherwise-handicapped have looked to their own internal 
resources – if only by working twice as hard as everyone else – so much so that they have been able 
to catch up with, and not infrequently to overtake, those who have sought to sustain their position of 
privilege by imposing a quite unjustified handicap on their ‘upstart’ rivals. Moreover those who do 
find themselves overtaken in this way often feel completely non-plussed, and most especially so 
when they have grounded their exclusionistic practices in assumptions about the innate inferiority 
of their rivals – as routinely occurs with respect to majority attitudes towards the visible minorities. 
Hence if members of excluded minorities do – despite everything – manage to succeed, this is best 
read not so much as an indication of the absence of exclusionism, but rather as an indication of just 
how threadbare the excluders’ strategies have become, and just how comprehensively they have 
misread – and indeed both overlooked and devalued – the alternative energies, competencies and 
resources on which those they have sought to exclude have been able to draw.  
 
This Chapter is written against a background of these concerns. It seeks to explore firstly the extent 
of upward socio-economic mobility that members of Britain’s visible minorities have managed to 
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achieve during the course of the past half century; secondly to explore how far these patterns of 
mobility have varied as between different sub-sections of the visible minority population; and 
thirdly to provide at least an outline of how both these achievements, and these inter-community 
variation, might best be explained. 
2 The initial socio-economic position of Britain’s visible minorities 
Having just entered the new millennium, it is instructive to reflect on just how much upward 
mobility the visible minorities have managed to achieve during the half-century which has passed 
since they first started to establish themselves in Britain in significant numbers. At the outset times 
were hard, but nevertheless the socio-economic position in which the newcomers found themselves 
is relatively easy to specify in analytical terms.  
 
As the post-war economic boom took off Britain found itself acutely short of labour, and despite 
regular economic upswings and downswings the labour market – and most especially the market for 
more-or-less unskilled labour – remained extremely tight for the best part of the next two decades. 
By now, however, Britain’s traditional reservoirs of reserve labour power, Ireland and Eastern 
Europe, were either exhausted or inaccessible; hence labour migrants began to drawn from Britain’s 
more distant Imperial possessions in ever-increasing numbers, despite the introduction of a whole 
series of Commonwealth Immigration Acts which were deliberately aimed at excluding them. 
 
Whilst only a small minority of these non-European had either professional qualifications or 
immediately marketable skills, those that did soon find that these potentialities were routinely 
overlooked. Their skin colour was used to define their competence – or rather their assumed lack of 
it. Hence whether qualified or unqualified, educated or uneducated (and the vast majority of 
migrants fell into the latter categories) they all found themselves consigned to a similar position in 
the local labour market can very easily be defined. Whether they took menial jobs in hospitals, 
catering or transport across the length and breadth of Britain, worked the night shifts in textile mills 
in Yorkshire and Lancashire, made bricks in Bedfordshire, or took the dirtiest, heaviest and most 
dangerous jobs in steel mills, foundries or rubber factories, the pattern was always the same: 
members of this new and very visible minority population soon found that the jobs towards which 
they were invariably directed, as well as those to which they had any prospect of easy access were 
those which indigenous workers sought at all costs to avoid. As such they rapidly came to form 
what can best be described as a racially marginalised and socially subordinated sub-proletariat.  
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3 Subsequent developments  
Much has changed since then, however. Since the late nineteen seventies Britain’s labour market 
has undergone all sorts of transformations. First of all the mean level of unemployment soared to 
unprecedented levels, with the result that the opportunities right at the bottom of the pile on which 
the newcomers had so long relied simply evaporated; secondly many of the very industries in which 
they had for so long been employed – such as textile manufacture, steel-making, and heavy 
engineering – disappeared with equal speed; and thirdly whilst the centre of gravity of the post-war 
labour market lay in manufacturing industry, it now lies very firmly in the service sector.  Given 
that all these changes have had a particularly drastic impact on just those sectors of the labour 
market into which post-war labour migrants were initially directed, they were not only 
disproportionately disadvantaged – at least by comparison with the indigenous majority – by these 
developments, but have also had to make by far the largest adjustments to survive them. 
 
At the same time the whole character of the visible minority population has changed dramatically. 
Although patterns vary as between its different communities, in most cases only a rapidly 
diminishing minority can now properly be identified as immigrants. Instead the ever-growing 
majority are British-born, British-reared and British-educated, and their families frequently 
established themselves in Britain two or even three generations back.  
 
In view of all these changes, there some obvious questions which need to be asked. How are they 
faring? How far have the older generation of settlers – many of whom are now reaching retirement 
aged – managed to overcome the sub-proletarian status to which they were initially assigned? And 
yet more pertinently still, have members of the locally-born second and third generation been any 
more successful – given their much greater familiarity with English ways – in overcoming the 
obstacles of exclusionism than were their parents and grandparents? Not only are such questions 
now well worth asking, but thanks to the inclusion of a explicitly formulated ethnic question in the 
1991 Census, together with its use in all manner of other data collection activities, we can at long 
last begin to answer those questions in a systematic and reasonably reliable way.  
 
Looking firstly at the position of the visible minorities in the class hierarchy, one of the most 
striking features of Table 1 is how far members of the visible minority population taken as a whole 
had managed to distance themselves from the sub-proletarian position in which they began by the 
time the census was taken in 1991. Perhaps not unexpectedly it is members of the oldest age cohort, 
and women much more than men, who have made the least progress. The great majority lacked any 
kind of formal educational qualification when they first arrived in the UK, and English very often 
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was not – and still very frequently is not – their first language. Be that as it may, any suggestion that 
the members of the far right hand column of the can still be described as a sub-proletariat, 
especially in the sense which they undoubtedly were at the very outset, is clearly erroneous. Whilst 
older women and men of colour are indeed rather more heavily concentrated in semi-skilled manual 
work than are their White counterparts, the difference between them – although significant – is no 
longer so great that it can reasonably be described as a yawning gulf. Meanwhile at the other end of 
age scale we find yet more dramatic signs of progress, so much so that a higher proportion of ethnic 
minority men aged between 18 and 29 are now to be found in each of the top three social classes 
than is the case amongst their white counterparts; controlling for gender, younger minority women 
do not lag far behind. In other however much of sub-proletariat members of the visible minorities 
may have formed when they first arrived, there is little – if any – merit in seeking to use a term of 
that kind as a means of explaining their current position in the British social order. It simply does 
not fit the facts.  
 
Social class 18 – 29 year olds 30 – 44 year olds 45 – 59 year olds 
Men Whites Visible 
minorities
Whites Visible 
minorities
Whites Visible 
minorities 
Professionals 5.8 7.3 8.2 10.4 7.3 9.3 
Managers 20.4 22.2 33.3 28.4 32.3 22.3 
Skilled non-manual 14.8 20.5 9.5 10.4 8.5 9.3 
Skilled Manual 32.7 24.8 31.3 28.1 32.3 28.5 
Semi-skilled 17.1 16.5 11.9 15.9 14.0 21.2 
Unskilled 5.5 4.0 3.4 3.4 4.2 6.8 
Women   
Professionals 2.4 3.6 2.2 3.1 1.0 1.9 
Managers 25.5 21.9 32.2 31.3 27.5 33.4 
Skilled non-manual 45.1 49.6 36.2 29.9 35.4 14.1 
Skilled Manual 7.7 5.2 6.1 6.2 7.3 7.4 
Semi-skilled 15.2 14.5 15.8 22.9 16.9 28.8 
Unskilled 3.0 2.4 6.8 4.4 11.1 12.2 
Table 1 Percentage distribution of economically active non-white men and women to their 
white counterparts, by age-group and social class. 
 
 Source: 1991 Census, Ethnic Group and Country of Birth, Table 16. 
 
That does not mean, however, that the facts themselves are at all straightforward, or in any way 
easy to explain, not least because the figures in Table 1 conceal at least as much as they reveal. In 
the first place the figures in Table 1 make no reference to levels of unemployment – which were 
substantially higher amongst most sections of the visible minority population than they were 
amongst the indigenous majority in 1991, and remain so to this day. Secondly, and perhaps even 
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more importantly, the visible minority population is not – at least in it members’ own terms – a 
homogeneous population group. To be sure they form a social category of those subjected to racial 
exclusionism, thanks to the continued commitment of members of Britain’s white majority to using 
skin colour as an inescapable indicator of alterity; however in their own terms, rather than those laid 
down by their excluders, members of this section of the population see themselves as being 
affiliated to a whole host of ethnically specific communities. And once we begin to factor these 
considerations into the statistics, some yet more complex patterns begin to emerge.  
 
Once the catch-all ‘visible minority’ category has been exploded into those of its ethnic components 
which the census data currently allows us to identify – as has been done in Table 2 – it becomes 
clear that many further complexities lie concealed behind the broad patterns revealed in Table 1. In 
particular it is immediately apparent that inter-minority differences are at least as great, and 
certainly just as analytically significant, as those thrown up by a simplistic juxtaposition of the 
achievements of ‘whites’ as against ‘blacks’.  
 
Nevertheless these figures still need to be approached with very considerable care. Hence, for 
example, whilst the exceptionally high proportion of 45 – 49 year old Bangladeshi women and men 
who show up as professionals is statistically accurate, the figures displayed in the table also need to 
be understood against an awareness of their specific ethnic context, namely the exceptionally low 
levels of economic activity displayed by older Bengalis of rural origin, which are in turn due to very 
high levels of long-term unemployment and ill-health (for men), together and their wives’ equally 
striking reluctance to enter the waged labour market. Hence even though doctors only form a very 
small proportion of Britain’s Bangladeshi population, given that most of them were recruited in the 
sixties and seventies, many are now in their fifties but still very actively employed, whilst an 
unusually high proportion of their labour-migrant peers have now withdrawn from active 
participation in the employment market. 
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Table 2 Percentage distribution of economically active non-white men and women to their white counterparts, by age-group and social class. 
Source: 1991 Census, Ethnic Group and Country of Birth, Table 16. 
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But although this serves to remind us that the specific character of the group in question must 
always be borne in mind when analysing  ethnic data – if only to ensure that one is really comparing 
like with like – the most salient feature of the array of figures set forth in Table 2 is comparatively 
easy to identify. In the first place no ethnic group – and no age group within any given ethnic group 
– is now so heavily concentrated at the bottom of the class hierarchy as to suggest that it is any way 
appropriate to identify its members unambiguously as an ‘under-class’ or ‘sub-proletariat’; but 
secondly, and just as importantly, the figures also show that both the extent and the character of the 
upward mobility achieved by the minorities varies enormously – and no less so by gender and age 
than by ethnic group. From this perspective Chinese and Indian men in the 18 – 29 year old age-
cohort appear to be amongst the most successful of all, at least by comparison with their white 
counterparts, whilst older Afro-Caribbean men appear to be amongst the least successful. But 
before leaping to instant conclusions about the possible associations between ethnicity and success, 
it is also worth noting that women’s achievements differ quite strikingly from men. Hence for 
example, an exceptionally high proportion of older Afro-Caribbean women are classified as being 
of managerial status, whilst younger Afro-Caribbean women’s achievements compare well with that 
of all other women in that age-group, apart from the exceptionally successful Chinese. Hence 
although the Table reveals an extensive degree of inter-ethnic differentiation in upward social 
mobility, it is nevertheless quite impossible to rank members of the six major ethnic categories 
along a single continuum from the less to the more successful.  
 
Such a finding is by no means novel, of course, for this picture complex differentials by gender, by 
age, as well as by ethnic affiliation is wholly congruent with the conclusions which Modood et. al. 
(1997) draw from the data collected in the 4th PSI Survey. Yet although it is now becoming 
increasingly clear that explaining these multi-dimensional patterns of inter-ethnic difference – as 
opposed to merely seeking to measure a unilateral condition of racial disadvantage – is the central 
issue which analysts in this field need to address, the results of the 1991 Census, as well as of the 4th 
PSI Survey, are becoming increasingly ill-suited for this task. Thus whilst the Census has the huge 
advantage of being based on a 100% sample, its data was not only collected the best part of a 
decade ago; and whilst the PSI survey was conducted rather more recently, and its relatively small 
sample data was drawn up in such a way that it cannot be viewed as perfectly statistically 
representative of the population as a whole. Hence in the remainder of this Chapter I have relied on 
data drawn from two much more recently constructed datasets: the Labour Force Survey for the 
period 1996 – 1998, and 1998 University entrance data released by the Universities and Colleges 
Admissions Service – both of which include ‘ethnic group’ in the sense used in the Census as a 
variable.  
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Yet although these datasets allow us to ask some much more detailed, more penetrating, and of 
course more up-to-date questions about inter-ethnic differentials in upward mobility than is possible 
with either the Census or the PSI, representing the complex patterns which emerge in a way which 
will be comprehensible to readers is an extremely challenging task. The solution adopted here as is 
follows. Tables 3 and 4 have exactly the same format Table 2, but by using data drawn from LFS, it 
is not only possible to identify a considerably wider range of occupational groups, but also the 
numbers – and hence the proportion – of men (Table 3) or women (Table 4) drawn from that ethnic 
group and falling into that age category who are ‘actively looking for work’, and hence 
unemployed. Last but not least the LFS also counts the number of people who are neither working 
nor looking for work – although given the LFS’s priorities, it provides a poor guide as to how many 
of these individuals are primarily engaged in looking after themselves and others at home, and how 
many are students.  
 
Yet although the differentials revealed in Tables 3 and 4 are undoubtedly extremely significant, the 
underlying patterns are hard to detect, and even harder to digest. Hence Tables 5 and 6 are based on 
exactly the same data as that set out in Tables 3 and 4, but this time the figures are ratios of the 
proportion of persons in any given ethnic group and age cohort as compared with their white 
counterparts. Hence whilst whites always by definition always score 1.0, a figure of 2.0 in any cell 
indicates that those persons are twice as frequently found in that occupational category than their 
white counterparts, and a figure of 0.5 that they are only half as likely to be so. To further aid 
comprehension I have set all scores greater than 1.5 in bold, and all those less than 0.5 in italics. 
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Men 20 – 29  year olds 30 – 39 year olds 40 – 49 year olds 50 – 59 year olds 
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aribbean  
Black African 
Professional occupations 11.0 7.4 10.8 7.9 8.6 1.5 5.7 19.0 29.0 22.9 14.6 9.2 11.0 10.3 21.9 25.0 26.2 8.9 18.5 11.5 10.3 19.9 34.6 16.4 10.0 10.5 6.3 7.1 
Managers and administrators 5.6 8.6 9.9 4.3 0.0 2.2 5.0 9.5 21.0 20.7 11.1 3.1 7.3 14.1 13.1 14.6 16.0 4.8 7.4 11.5 11.5 8.1 7.7 10.7 4.3 5.3 3.1 19.0 
Assoc professionals & technicians  6.1 2.5 9.9 2.4 1.4 7.3 2.1 9.7 4.8 6.1 4.1 1.5 7.8 10.3 7.5 4.2 4.9 1.4 3.7 3.1 14.9 6.2 11.5 4.2 1.4 0.0 2.1 7.1 
Clerical, secretarial occupations 7.9 4.9 10.8 7.1 4.3 10.9 4.3 4.7 1.6 5.9 7.6 4.6 3.7 8.3 3.8 2.1 5.2 2.1 0.0 4.2 8.0 4.0 0.0 5.1 5.7 0.0 1.0 4.8 
Craft and related occupations 18.7 1.2 6.8 5.9 2.9 9.5 2.1 19.2 0.0 10.1 5.8 0.0 17.8 2.6 15.5 2.1 12.5 8.9 7.4 20.8 2.3 15.7 3.8 7.0 4.3 5.3 13.5 4.8 
Personal, protective occupations 6.7 11.1 1.5 4.7 45.7 8.8 8.5 5.7 24.2 3.2 2.3 38.5 5.9 9.0 4.8 22.9 1.5 3.4 22.2 6.3 9.2 3.4 19.2 2.3 1.4 5.3 7.3 9.5 
Sales occupations 5.2 3.7 10.5 7.1 5.7 5.8 7.1 3.9 3.2 3.5 6.4 4.6 3.2 3.8 2.0 4.2 3.8 4.8 3.7 1.0 2.3 2.4 0.0 3.3 2.9 0.0 2.1 0.0 
Plant and machine operatives 9.5 1.2 7.1 16.9 1.4 9.5 6.4 11.5 1.6 12.8 18.1 1.5 13.2 7.7 11.7 2.1 13.7 21.2 0.0 16.7 9.2 13.1 3.8 8.9 14.3 0.0 26.0 11.9 
Other occupations 8.8 4.9 1.9 5.5 2.9 6.6 5.0 5.1 1.6 4.3 3.5 6.2 7.8 5.1 4.8 2.1 4.4 2.7 3.7 3.1 8.0 4.2 0.0 5.1 7.1 5.3 8.3 2.4 
Currently looking for work 9.0 8.6 10.5 20.1 11.4 21.2 22.0 4.1 9.7 5.9 15.8 18.5 13.2 12.8 4.8 6.3 5.5 16.4 7.4 12.5 9.2 4.7 0.0 9.8 12.9 15.8 8.3 19.0 
Inactive (includes students) 11.0 45.7 18.8 17.7 14.3 15.3 30.5 7.2 3.2 4.5 10.5 10.8 8.2 14.1 9.8 10.4 6.1 24.0 25.9 5.2 14.9 18.3 19.2 26.6 35.7 52.6 21.9 14.3 
Number of persons in sample 809 81 324 254 70 137 141 1030 62 376 171 65 219 156 918 48 344 146 27 96 87 860 26 214 70 19 96 42 
Table 3 Proportion of men in each ethnic group and in successive ten-year age cohorts by major occupational group; 
Source: QLFS96q4 + QLFS98q1, using 100% of minority cases, and a 5% sample of white cases 
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Women 20 – 29 year olds 30 – 39 year olds 40 – 49 year olds 50 – 59 year olds 
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Professional occupations 7.2 3.3 4.6 1.3 0.9 2.7 5.1 10.9 11.0 7.6 2.6 2.9 7.9 3.6 10.0 7.3 6.6 0.6 2.1 3.8 1.4 6.9 21.6 5.5 0.0 0.0 1.6 0.0 
Managers and administrators 5.1 9.8 7.0 3.5 1.7 3.4 0.0 7.1 8.2 7.1 2.6 2.9 7.5 3.6 8.8 4.9 6.0 3.6 0.0 5.5 5.4 6.4 8.1 5.0 0.0 0.0 2.5 0.0 
Assoc professionals & technicians  7.2 6.6 5.3 3.2 0.9 3.4 5.1 9.3 8.2 6.7 0.0 0.0 11.8 6.7 8.2 18.3 7.6 3.6 0.0 17.5 10.8 5.5 5.4 4.0 0.0 0.0 18.9 20.9 
Clerical, secretarial occupations 21.5 8.2 18.9 7.6 6.1 18.4 5.1 16.9 13.7 16.0 4.5 2.9 22.3 8.7 19.0 7.3 12.6 3.6 0.0 19.7 10.8 14.5 2.7 4.0 0.0 3.3 1.6 9.3 
Craft and related occupations 1.0 0.0 2.3 3.2 0.9 2.0 0.7 1.3 1.4 5.3 3.2 0.0 0.7 0.0 2.6 1.2 8.3 0.6 0.0 1.1 0.0 2.2 0.0 4.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.0 
Personal, protective occupations 13.5 11.5 1.3 2.9 2.6 15.0 9.6 9.0 8.2 4.4 2.6 5.7 10.5 13.3 10.5 8.5 4.6 3.0 0.0 13.7 13.5 9.6 2.7 3.5 7.5 0.0 19.7 7.0 
Sales occupations 7.1 6.6 9.6 4.4 5.2 4.8 5.1 7.1 8.2 5.1 1.9 0.0 3.3 4.6 6.4 6.1 3.3 1.8 2.1 2.7 6.8 7.2 2.7 3.0 1.5 0.0 1.6 0.0 
Plant and machine operatives 3.7 0.0 4.0 2.2 1.7 0.0 0.7 2.7 1.4 5.1 0.6 5.7 1.0 1.0 4.6 2.4 8.6 2.4 0.0 1.1 0.0 1.8 5.4 6.5 3.0 0.0 8.2 0.0 
Other occupations 3.5 1.6 1.0 0.6 0.0 0.7 7.4 6.2 2.7 4.0 0.6 0.0 3.9 8.2 5.4 6.1 5.6 1.8 0.0 6.0 8.1 5.3 5.4 2.5 1.5 0.0 12.3 2.3 
Currently looking for work 5.1 3.3 9.6 7.6 6.1 16.3 16.2 3.2 5.5 4.7 4.5 2.9 6.9 12.8 2.9 6.1 3.3 4.8 2.1 5.5 12.2 2.2 2.7 5.0 4.5 0.0 3.3 11.6 
Inactive (includes students) 25.0 49.2 34.8 62.2 73.9 32.0 44.1 25.9 31.5 32.9 76.8 77.1 23.9 37.4 21.4 30.5 32.5 73.7 93.6 23.5 31.1 37.7 40.5 57.2 82.1 96.7 29.5 46.5 
Number of persons in sample 865 61 302 315 115 147 136 1145 73 450 155 35 305 195 973 82 302 167 47 183 74 853 37 201 67 30 122 43 
Table 4 Proportion of women in each ethnic group and in successive ten-year age cohorts by major occupational group; 
Source: QLFS96q4 + QLFS98q1, using 100% of minority cases, and a 5% sample of white cases 
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Men 20 – 29 year olds 30 – 39 year olds 40 – 49 year olds 50 – 59 year olds 
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Professional occupations 1.0 1.6 1.8 0.8 0.0 0.4 0.9 1.0 2.2 2.2 1.2 0.3 0.8 1.5 1.0 1.1 1.2 0.4 0.6 0.9 0.9 1.0 0.9 1.3 0.5 0.6 0.4 2.3 
Managers and administrators 1.0 0.7 1.0 0.7 0.8 0.1 0.5 1.0 1.5 1.2 0.8 0.5 0.6 0.5 1.0 1.1 1.2 0.4 0.8 0.5 0.5 1.0 1.7 0.8 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.4 
Assoc professionals & technicians  1.0 0.4 1.6 0.4 0.2 1.2 0.4 1.0 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.8 1.1 1.0 0.6 0.7 0.2 0.5 0.4 2.0 1.0 1.9 0.7 0.2 0.0 0.3 1.2 
Clerical, secretarial occupations 1.0 0.6 1.4 0.9 0.5 1.4 0.5 1.0 0.3 1.3 1.6 1.0 0.8 1.8 1.0 0.5 1.4 0.5 0.0 1.1 2.1 1.0 0.0 1.3 1.4 0.0 0.3 1.2 
Craft and related occupations 1.0 0.1 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.5 0.1 1.0 0.0 0.5 0.3 0.0 0.9 0.1 1.0 0.1 0.8 0.6 0.5 1.3 0.1 1.0 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.9 0.3 
Personal, protective occupations 1.0 1.7 0.2 0.7 6.8 1.3 1.3 1.0 4.2 0.6 0.4 6.7 1.0 1.6 1.0 4.8 0.3 0.7 4.6 1.3 1.9 1.0 5.7 0.7 0.4 1.6 2.2 2.8 
Sales occupations 1.0 0.7 2.0 1.4 1.1 1.1 1.4 1.0 0.8 0.9 1.7 1.2 0.8 1.0 1.0 2.1 1.9 2.4 1.9 0.5 1.2 1.0 0.0 1.3 1.2 0.0 0.9 0.0 
Plant and machine operatives 1.0 0.1 0.7 1.8 0.2 1.0 0.7 1.0 0.1 1.1 1.6 0.1 1.2 0.7 1.0 0.2 1.2 1.8 0.0 1.4 0.8 1.0 0.3 0.7 1.1 0.0 2.0 0.9 
Other occupations 1.0 0.6 0.2 0.6 0.3 0.7 0.6 1.0 0.3 0.8 0.7 1.2 1.5 1.0 1.0 0.4 0.9 0.6 0.8 0.7 1.7 1.0 0.0 1.2 1.7 1.3 2.0 0.6 
Currently looking for work 1.0 1.0 1.2 2.2 1.3 2.3 2.4 1.0 2.4 1.4 3.9 4.5 3.2 3.1 1.0 1.3 1.2 3.4 1.5 2.6 1.9 1.0 0.0 2.1 2.8 3.4 1.8 4.1 
Inactive (includes students) 1.0 4.2 1.7 1.6 1.3 1.4 2.8 1.0 0.4 0.6 1.5 1.5 1.1 2.0 1.0 1.1 0.6 2.4 2.6 0.5 1.5 1.0 1.1 1.5 2.0 2.9 1.2 0.8 
Table 5 Ratios of non-white men to their white counterparts, by age-group, ethnic group and occupational category 
Source: QLFS96q4 + QLFS98q1, using 100% of minority cases, and a 5% sample of white cases 
Key: Since the figures in this grid are ratios, White always = 1.0; if the proportion of members of a minority group involved in a given occupation is 
twice as great as amongst the whites, they are recorded as scoring 2.0; if half as great they score 0.5, etc. For ease of comprehension if the score is 
greater than 1.5 it appears in bold, and if less than 0.5 in italics. 
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Women 20 – 29 year olds 30 – 39 year olds 40 – 49 year olds 50 – 59 year olds 
 
W
hite 
C
hinese 
Indian 
Pakistani 
Bangladeshi 
Black 
Caribbean
Black 
African
W
hite 
C
hinese 
Indian 
Pakistani 
Bangladeshi 
Black 
Caribbean
Black 
African
W
hite 
C
hinese 
Indian 
Pakistani 
Bangladeshi 
Black 
Caribbean
Black 
African
W
hite 
C
hinese 
Indian 
Pakistani 
Bangladeshi 
Black 
Caribbean
Black 
African
Professional occupations 1.0 1.9 1.4 0.7 0.3 0.7 0.0 1.0 1.2 1.0 0.4 0.4 1.1 0.5 1.0 0.6 0.7 0.4 0.0 0.6 0.6 1.0 1.3 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 
Managers and administrators 1.0 0.5 0.6 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.7 1.0 1.0 0.7 0.2 0.3 0.7 0.3 1.0 0.7 0.7 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.1 1.0 3.1 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 
Assoc professionals & technicians  1.0 0.9 0.7 0.4 0.1 0.5 0.7 1.0 0.9 0.7 0.0 0.0 1.3 0.7 1.0 2.2 0.9 0.4 0.0 2.1 1.3 1.0 1.0 0.7 0.0 0.0 3.4 3.8 
Clerical, secretarial occupations 1.0 0.4 0.9 0.4 0.3 0.9 0.2 1.0 0.8 0.9 0.3 0.2 1.3 0.5 1.0 0.4 0.7 0.2 0.0 1.0 0.6 1.0 0.2 0.3 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.6 
Craft and related occupations 1.0 0.0 2.2 3.1 0.8 2.0 0.7 1.0 1.0 4.1 2.5 0.0 0.5 0.0 1.0 0.5 3.2 0.2 0.0 0.4 0.0 1.0 0.0 1.8 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 
Personal, protective occupations 1.0 0.8 0.1 0.2 0.2 1.1 0.7 1.0 0.9 0.5 0.3 0.6 1.2 1.5 1 .0 0.8 0.4 0.3 0.0 1.3 1.3 1.0 0.3 0.4 0.8 0.0 2.0 0.7 
Sales occupations 1.0 0.9 1.4 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7 1.0 1.2 0.7 0.3 0.0 0.5 0.7 1.0 1.0 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.4 1.1 1.0 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.0 
Plant and machine operatives 1.0 0.0 1.1 0.6 0.5 0.0 0.2 1.0 0.5 1.9 0.2 2.1 0.4 0.4 1.0 0.5 1.9 0.5 0.0 0.2 0.0 1.0 3.1 3.7 1.7 0.0 4.7 0.0 
Other occupations 1.0 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.0 0.2 2.1 1.0 0.4 0.6 0.1 0.0 0.6 1.3 1.0 1.1 1.0 0.3 0.0 1.1 1.5 1.0 1.0 0.5 0.3 0.0 2.3 0.4 
Currently looking for work 1.0 0.6 1.9 1.5 1.2 3.2 3.2 1.0 1.7 1.4 1.4 0.9 2.1 4.0 1.0 2.1 1.2 1.7 0.7 1.9 4.2 1.0 1.2 2.2 2.0 0.0 1.5 5.2 
Inactive (includes students) 1.0 2.0 1.4 2.5 3.0 1.3 1.8 1.0 1.2 1.3 3.0 3.0 0.9 1.4 1.0 1.4 1.5 3.4 4.4 1.1 1.5 1.0 1.1 1.5 2.2 2.6 0.8 1.2 
Table 6 Ratios of non-white women to their white counterparts, by age-group, ethnic group and occupational category 
Source: QLFS96q4 + QLFS98q1, using 100% of minority cases, and a 5% sample of white cases 
Key: Since the figures in this grid are ratios, White always = 1.0; if the proportion of members of a minority group involved in a given occupation is 
twice as great as amongst the whites, they are recorded as scoring 2.0; if half as great they score 0.5, etc. For ease of comprehension if the score is 
greater than 1.5 it appears in bold, and if less than 0.5 in italics.. 
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What, though, about the patterns which emerge as a result of performing such an exercise? As the 
figures in Table 5 yet again confirm, the Chinese and the Indians are not only achieving by far the 
highest level of upward social mobility of all the visible minority communities, but are now 
significantly outperforming the white population as a whole in terms of the scale of their entry into 
professional occupations. Indeed by the time they reach their thirties, men from both groups are 
more than twice as likely as their white counterparts to be professionally employed; moreover by 
comparison with their achievements, Pakistani and the African men fall some way behind, whilst 
both the Black Caribbeans and the Bangladeshi yet further behind still. Turning next to the extent 
that minority women have found their way into the top three occupational categories, the Chinese 
and  the Indians once again stand out as being the most successful, even if this has not been  – or at 
least has not yet been – quite so dramatic as their male counterparts, whilst Pakistani and 
Bangladeshi women have as yet achieved very much less, Afro-Caribbean women, and most 
especially those in their thirties, have made a very creditable showing in the top three occupational 
categories.  
 
If, next, we turn to the bottom end of the occupational hierarchy, Table 5 not only confirms the 
success with which visible minority men have moved away from the jobs as plant and machine 
operatives in the now much depleted industrial sectors in which they began, but also that there is an 
ethnic dimension to that exodus, since only the Pakistanis (and to a much lesser extent the Afro-
Caribbeans, the Africans and the older Indians) are over-concentrated in this sector. But in 
identifying where they have gone, it is worth noting just how heavily over-represented the 
Bangladeshis and all but the youngest age-cohort of Chinese are in the ‘personal and protective’ 
sector – which along with sales, is where those working in restaurants and the fast-food trade are 
routinely categorised. Turning next to their female counterparts, it is striking that whilst older Afro-
Caribbean, Chinese, Indian and Pakistani women are all still very strikingly over-represented in 
what one might describe as ‘bottom of the pile’ manufacturing jobs, this tendency has wholly 
evaporated in every group but the Indians drawn from amongst the youngest age cohort, all of 
whom – with the exception of Bangladeshis and the Africans – are heavily over-represented in Craft 
and related occupations if they have not moved on into Professional jobs.  
 
Finally it is also worth taking a close look at what is going on right at the bottom of the Tables in 
the rows marked ‘Currently looking for work’ and ‘Inactive’. Moreover if we look back to Tables 3 
and 4, the currently looking for work figures could equally well have been marked ‘percentage 
unemployed’, and from this perspective some very striking differentials arise, not least because in 
every group but the Chinese (and this would appear to be a sampling error), levels of 
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unemployment amongst the visible minorities are higher – and often strikingly higher – than they 
are amongst the white majority; a similar pattern can also be found amongst women. Hence if the 
upper portions of these Tables provides plentiful evidence of minority success, these rows provide 
the clearest possible evidence that such achievements are not plain sailing: higher levels of 
unemployment  provide a very clear measure of the greater degree of difficulty which members of 
the visible minorities encounter in actually getting a job.  
 
Finally an examination of the last row in the four tables is also instructive, even though the catch-all 
‘inactive’ category rather unhelpfully aggregates full-time students (who presumably will enter the 
employment market as soon as they have gained their qualifications) with those who are not 
participating for all manner of other reasons. Nevertheless the inter-ethnic variations in this sphere 
are no less striking than those elsewhere. Whilst sharply raised levels of inactivity amongst both 
men and women of all the minority groups is best accounted for as the outcome of their much 
higher levels of participation in higher education (a subject which will shortly be addressed in its 
own right), patterns of inactivity amongst the older age groups, and especially amongst older 
women, deserve very careful attention. Assuming that involvement in full-time education is not 
statistically significant amongst the over-40s, one of the most striking features of the figures in 
Table 4 is that the great majority of older Pakistani, and even more so of Bangladeshi women are 
non-participants in the waged labour market. By contrast Indian women in their 40s, and even more 
so Caribbean women in that age-cohort are a great deal more likely than their white counterparts to 
go out to work. Given the ever increasing importance of women’s contribution to the budgets of 
most households, the reluctance of most older Pakistani and Bangladeshi women to seek 
employment outside the household will inevitably have a negative impact on household budgets, 
just as the enthusiasm with which Indian women have sought paid employment has had just the 
opposite effect. Meanwhile Caribbean women stand in a special category of their own, for although 
no less than half of all Caribbean women head single-parent households, they are not only more 
likely to go out to work than their white counterparts, regardless of household structure, but are also 
significantly out-performing Caribbean men in terms of their upward mobility through the 
employment market. Ethnic agency is clearly at work here. 
 
Since agency is above all a qualitative phenomenon, quantitative data tends, by its very nature, to 
offer few indications of how such processes of agency actually operate: the only evidence it 
normally provides are empirical outcomes such as those explored in the last few pages, and for 
which the only plausible explanation is that the differential patterns we have detected are the 
outcome of processes of ethnic agency. Sometimes, however, it is possible to go rather further than 
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this by exploring the differential basis on which upward mobility appears to have been achieved. It 
has, of course, long been argued that self-employment can often provide an effective means of 
circumventing the worst of racial exclusionism, on two grounds: firstly that the kinship-based 
resources which facilitate the development of entrepreneurial initiatives – and most especially 
resilient extended family networks – are differentially distributed by ethnicity; and secondly on the 
grounds that despite the extreme reluctance of most white gate-keepers to allocate scarce resources 
to members of visible minorities whilst there is still any kind of prospect of diverting them to 
members of their own group, those self-same excluders frequently display no compunction 
whatsoever of purchasing goods and services from members of the minorities provided they make 
their wares available at the right place and the right time, as well as at a keen price. How far, 
therefore, does the LFS serve to confirm that such processes may currently be at work?  
 
Tables 5 and 6 are based solely on data on those people who are actively employed, and sets out the 
percentage of persons in each ethnic group who fall into the nine major occupational categories, but 
further differentiating them by whether, within each of these categories, those involved are paid 
employees or self-employed. For simplicity’s sake no age dimension has been introduced into either 
of these Tables. In making sense of the two Tables the best place to begin is right at the bottom, for 
the row marked ‘all occupations’ gives an overall indication of the percentage of ethnic group 
members who are self employed. In these terms Table 5 shows that whilst the Chinese, the Indian 
and Pakistani men are considerably more likely to be self-employed than their white counterparts, 
Bangladeshis, Black Caribbeans and Black Africans – who in broad terms are also less upwardly 
mobile – are considerably less likely to be so. It is also worth noting how far the various groups 
differ in terms of the sector of the employment market where self-employment is most salient. Thus 
whilst for the whites self-employment is a particularly strongly preferred option amongst skilled 
craftsmen, the figures suggest that our three most upwardly mobile minority groups – the Chinese, 
the Indians and the Pakistanis – have used self-employment as a means of breaking into the 
otherwise highly privileged bastion of the professions. Over and above this the Pakistanis also make 
a strong showing as self-employed plant and machine operatives, largely as a result of the heavy 
involvement of middle-aged Pakistani men in driving taxis. By contrast the differential patterns for 
women set out in Table 6 are so far rather less dramatic, although they also suggest that 
professionally qualified minority women from all groups except the Black Africans and the Black 
Caribbeans are finding self-employment offers a particularly effective way of overcoming the 
obstacles they face. 
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Men White Chinese Indian Pakistani Bangladeshi Black 
Caribbean 
Black  
African 
 Employee 
Self-
em
ployed 
Em
ployee 
Self-
em
ployed 
Em
ployee 
Self-
em
ployed 
Em
ployee 
Self-
em
ployed 
Em
ployee 
Self-
em
ployed 
Em
ployee 
Self-
em
ployed 
Em
ployee 
Self-
em
ployed 
Professional occupations 18.1 3.9 13.3 16.7 14.0 10.6 8.4 7.7 10.8 5.0 9.8 1.0 11.9 1.5
Managers and administrators 8.8 2.3 16.7 2.7 14.2 4.6 7.9 2.0 4.2 0.0 7.1 1.3 13.7 3.7
Associate professional & tech  7.2 1.8 6.0 0.7 6.8 1.3 3.5 0.5 2.5 0.0 6.0 2.0 11.9 1.1
Clerical, secretarial occupations 5.9 0.1 4.0 0.0 8.3 0.3 9.4 0.0 5.0 0.0 7.1 0.0 10.4 0.0
Craft and related occupations 14.5 6.4 2.0 0.0 9.6 2.2 8.2 2.0 4.2 0.0 17.9 3.5 3.3 0.7
 Personal, protective occupations 6.1 0.1 21.3 5.3 2.7 0.0 5.0 0.5 49.2 4.2 9.1 0.5 14.1 0.0
Sales occupations 3.4 0.6 4.0 0.7 5.9 0.8 8.2 1.2 4.2 2.5 4.5 0.0 5.6 1.1
 Plant and machine operatives 12.6 1.3 2.7 0.0 12.5 1.2 15.8 12.6 0.8 0.8 18.4 2.5 10.0 2.6
Other occupations 5.8 1.0 4.0 0.0 4.6 0.2 7.2 0.0 6.7 0.0 8.6 0.8 8.1 0.4
All occupations 82.4 17.6 74.0 26.0 78.8 21.2 73.5 26.5 87.5 12.5 88.4 11.6 88.9 11.1
Table 7 Percentage distribution of employed men in each Ethnic group by status as Employee and Self-employed and by major occupational 
categories 
 
Source: QLFS96q4 + QLFS98q1, 100% of minority cases, and 5% sample of white cases  
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Women White Chinese Indian Pakistani Bangladeshi Black 
Caribbean 
Black  
African 
 Employee 
Self-
em
ployed 
Em
ployee 
Self-
em
ployed 
Em
ployee 
Self-
em
ployed 
Em
ployee 
Self-
em
ployed 
Em
ployee 
Self-
em
ployed 
Em
ployee 
Self-
em
ployed 
Em
ployee 
Self-
em
ployed 
Professional occupations 10.3 2.6 6.8 9.6 7.4 3.8 3.0 2.4 6.1 3.0 7.3 0.2 5.3 1.9
Managers and administrators 9.1 1.0 12.3 0.7 10.3 1.1 11.6 1.2 9.1 0.0 7.9 0.4 3.8 1.4
Associate professional & tech  9.8 1.3 16.4 2.1 9.9 1.0 8.5 1.2 3.0 0.0 18.5 0.8 15.8 1.9
Clerical, secretarial occupations 25.0 0.9 14.4 0.7 24.6 0.1 22.0 0.6 27.3 0.0 26.8 0.0 17.2 0.0
Craft and related occupations 2.1 0.5 1.4 0.0 8.8 0.3 9.1 0.6 3.0 0.0 1.4 0.2 0.0 0.5
 Personal, protective occupations 14.4 0.9 13.7 0.7 6.1 0.3 12.8 1.2 12.1 3.0 20.8 0.0 24.4 0.5
Sales occupations 9.7 0.3 11.0 0.0 9.3 0.3 12.8 0.0 21.2 0.0 4.8 0.0 9.1 1.0
 Plant and machine operatives 4.5 0.2 3.4 0.0 10.3 0.1 8.5 0.0 12.1 0.0 3.0 0.0 1.4 0.0
Other occupations 7.1 0.5 6.8 0.0 6.1 0.0 3.7 0.6 0.0 0.0 7.9 0.0 15.8 0.0
All occupations 91.9 8.1 86.3 13.7 92.9 7.1 92.1 7.9 93.9 6.1 98.4 1.6 92.8 7.2
Table 8 Percentage distribution of employed women in each Ethnic group by status as Employee and Self-employed and by major 
occupational categories 
 
Source: QLFS96q4 + QLFS98q1, 100% of minority cases, and 5% sample of white cases  
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4 Upward mobility through the educational system 
 
Once they had established a toehold in Britain, the only way in which most of the first generation of 
settlers could hope to dodge the worst impact  of racial exclusionism, and hence press their way 
upwards through the local social order, was through endless hard work, further reinforced by 
making the most of their own individual and collective entrepreneurial resources; but in the course 
of so doing only a tiny minority were able to rely on any educational and professional qualifications 
which they might have brought with them, for even if they possessed such qualifications they soon 
found that they were routinely devalued by virtually all potential employers. As a result most 
members of the first generation had little alternative but to start again, virtually from scratch, in 
their new, largely unfamiliar, and all too often hostile environment.  
 
By contrast the second and third generation have found themselves in a rather different position, not 
so much because the forces of exclusionism which they encountered were any less, but rather 
because they own personal experiences were very different. Given that they had been born and 
brought up in Britain, they were not only far more familiar with the ways of the native English than 
their parents ever could be, but they also had direct access to the British educational system. It 
would, of course, be idle to suggest that educational success removes all the obstacles in the way of 
rapid socio-economic advancement – most particularly if one has the misfortune to belong to an 
excluded and socially disadvantaged minority. Nevertheless it is equally clear that educational 
success is a necessary precursor to any kind of upward economic mobility, for without the 
necessary skills and qualifications there is absolutely no chance whatsoever of challenging those 
exclusionary tendencies. Hence in making any assessment of the likely future prospects of Britain’s 
visible minority populations – let alone of explaining the developments highlighted in the previous 
section – assessing the educational achievements of the rising generation becomes a crucial issue. 
 
Until recently it has been virtually impossible to undertake such an exercise: there is little co-
ordination between Local Education Authorities, so despite much verbal commitment to the 
importance of ethnic monitoring, data on pupils ethnic affiliation is neither routinely nor 
systematically recorded. But although similar deficiencies can also be observed in many other areas 
of public service delivery, there is one very significant exception to this regrettable tendency: for 
some years the Universities and Colleges Admissions Service (UCAS) has collected (and more 
recently begun to publish) detailed figures on the ethnic affiliation of all home-based students by 
applying for – and accepted onto – undergraduate degree courses in the UK. Moreover the dataset 
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also includes a number of other critical variables, including every applicant’s sex, age, A level point 
score, the type of educational establishment they previously attended and their parents’ social class. 
Since UCAS data it assembled on a national basis, and since more than a third of all school leavers 
now apply to enter Universities or Colleges through UCAS, it not only provides a unique insight 
into the frequency with which minority applicants are gaining access to the higher educational 
system, but also – and just as illuminatingly – to data on their parents’ social class, the A level 
scores which they achieved, and the types of schools they attended in order to obtain them. All 
these issues are explored in some detail in the Tables which follow. 
4.1 A level scores of minority applicants 
Given that virtually everyone who takes A levels submits an application for university entrance – 
regardless of whether they actually take up any offer which they may receive, the data available 
from UCCA provides an extremely reliable, and nationally comprehensive, indicator of school 
performance. With issues of ethnic pluralism in mind, three sets of questions are worth exploring in 
detail. Firstly the participation rate: or in other words the proportion of school-leavers in each ethnic 
group who sit A level at all, regardless of the results they achieve; secondly the point-scores which 
they actually achieved; and thirdly the type of educational establishment they attended whilst doing 
so. 
 
 Looking firstly at what can best be described as the A level participation rate, one of the most 
striking features of Table 9 is that in every group except Caribbean men, the participation rate 
amongst young people of minority descent is now at least closely akin to that displayed by the white 
majority, and that amongst the Indians, and even more so amongst the Chinese, the participation 
rate is now very substantially higher than that found amongst the white majority. The figures also 
serve to demonstrate that the widespread belief that Muslim parents are strongly resistant to the 
prospect of seeing their daughters gain advanced educational qualifications is wholly unsound. In 
both of Britain’s two largest Muslim communities, the Pakistanis and the Bangladeshis, the A level 
participation rate is now higher for women than it is amongst the white majority.  
 
A further striking feature of Table 9 is that even amongst those groups where a disproportionately 
high number of youngsters take A levels, their mean performance does not suffer as a consequence: 
hence whilst the Chinese display an extraordinary high participation rate, their over-all pattern of 
the results is nevertheless still better than those achieved by the white majority; and whilst the mean 
A level performance of the Indians is still slightly lower than that achieved by the whites, their 
participation rate is now very substantially higher.  
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 Whites Chinese Indians Pakistanis Bangladeshis Afro-Caribs Africans 
 Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women 
Total applicants with A levels 82,048 98,831 968 943 3,954 4,263 1,923 1,868 564 592 683 1,273 661 904 
A level participation rate1 26.55 33.68 81.76 85.05 49.34 55.54 29.16 30.62 23.15 26.83 18.31 34.79 21.65 30.39 
A level results   
% group scoring 26 – 30 points2 23.51 23.21 30.17 26.19 25.59 18.65 17.47 14.35 20.21 12.50 10.83 8.01 13.46 12.17 
21 – 25 points     15.90 17.47 14.36 14.85 13.28 14.03 12.48 12.42 10.82 14.70 8.64 11.23 11.65 12.39 
16 – 20 points 25.68 26.76 20.25 23.75 20.94 24.26 23.09 25.00 23.58 22.97 24.45 24.98 23.00 25.33 
11 – 15 points 16.59 15.95 16.22 18.24 16.77 17.97 17.21 19.43 17.02 17.57 18.45 21.60 18.76 21.79 
6 – 10 points 16.40 15.00 16.01 14.63 20.13 21.84 25.17 25.00 25.53 28.89 31.77 30.09 29.20 24.56 
0 – 5 points  1.91 1.62 3.00 2.33 3.29 3.26 4.58 3.80 2.84 3.38 5.86 4.08 3.93 3.76 
Mean A level score 18.39 18.66 18.87 18.64 17.88 16.99 16.31 16.01 16.73 15.71 14.54 14.66 15.48 15.73 
Type of school attended   
Independent 13.14 10.03 24.46 17.79 14.74 10.71 5.83 5.49 6.97 6.50 2.96 2.35 4.73 5.57 
Grant maintained 9.79 8.20 9.83 8.02 11.57 13.00 6.74 8.66 4.84 6.10 4.44 4.17 3.93 3.59 
Comprehensive 30.84 32.32 20.14 22.14 18.02 21.93 15.61 22.42 13.61 28.86 9.91 7.76 6.70 10.53 
HE College 32.10 35.69 33.65 40.52 43.10 43.61 53.89 49.63 58.61 47.15 51.94 59.93 43.66 49.19 
Unknown 13.72 13.47 11.67 10.94 11.93 9.99 16.88 13.34 15.41 11.11 29.38 24.56 40.38 30.26 
Table 9 A level scores and schools attended of applicants to UK Universities by ethnicity and sex 
Source UCAS: Applicants to Universities and Colleges in UK, 1998.  
 
                                                 
1 This figure has been calculated by dividing the number of applicants with A levels by my best estimate – using the results of the 1991 Census - of the number of men and women 
who would have reached the age of 18 in 1998.  
2 Points are assigned on the basis that A grade = 5, B = 4, C = 3, D = 2 and E =1. 
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By contrast the Bangladeshis, the Afro-Caribbeans and the Africans not only under-achieve in terms 
of participation, but the mean levels of performance of those who do get that far is also 
disappointingly low. Last put not least the bottom five rows in the Table clearly provide an 
important indicator of one of the reasons – although it is clearly not the only reason – as to how and 
why these differential levels of performance may have come about. A much higher proportion of 
Chinese students, and a slightly higher proportion of Indian students than white studied for their A 
levels at independent schools; meanwhile a disproportionately large number of Africans, Afro-
Caribbeans and above all Bangladeshis came in through the HE College route. 
4.2 Ethnic minority participation in Higher Education 
Whilst it is only to be expected that higher levels of participation at A levels, together with better 
than average performance in the exams themselves will translate into better than average levels of 
participation in Higher Education itself, one of the most striking features of Table 10 is that all the 
minorities have yet further increased their level performance at this level: everyone but Afro-
Caribbean men, and by a very small margin Bangladeshi women display a higher participation ratio 
than whites. The best explanation for this is that whilst a significant number of white students drop 
out at this stage, either because their results are too poor to secure a University place, or because 
they move straight into employment, the minorities are not only much less likely to take the latter 
option, but if their grades are inadequate, they are much more likely simply to resit their exams, and 
to apply again the following year. The figures in Table 10 also serve to remind us that A levels do 
not provide the only route into University courses, and that mature students (i.e. those aged over 22) 
may also be accepted on the basis of a wide range of alternative qualifications. Such students often 
performed relatively poorly – at least in academic terms – at school, and use the FE system to catch 
up later on. Hence what is also striking about the figures in Table 10 is the extremely high  
frequency with which Afro-Caribbean and Black African students enter higher education along this 
route. Turning next to the social class background of the recruits, one of the most striking features 
of Table 10 is how unimpressed members of all the minorities appear to be with the long-standing 
English view that working class people have no place in Higher Education. Hence whilst two thirds 
of White students’ parents are in non-manual occupations, leaving the children of non-manual 
workers heavily under-represented  in the Higher Educational system, this is very clearly not the 
case amongst the visible minorities. Indeed if we assume (as seems reasonable) that virtually all 
those parents whose social class was recorded as “unknown” in the UCAS were in fact unemployed, 
and most of these would have been doing manual jobs if any had been available, occupations, the 
capacity of the visible minorities to overcome the British educational system’s well known 
obstacles of class can only be described as truly remarkable.  
 24 
 
 
 
 Whites Chinese Indians Pakistanis Bangladeshis Afro-Caribs Black Africans 
Entrants Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women 
Total entrants 99,740 117,142 1,251 1,197 5,271 5,398 3,158 2,587 889 738 1,406 2,611 1,986 1,976 
Entrants aged 17 – 21 87,212 100,951 1,132 1,091 4,930 5,103 2,783 2,311 789 683 833 1,525 910 1,146 
Participation ratio (17 –21 year olds) 28.2 34.4 95.6 98.4 61.5 66.5 42.2 37.9 32.4 31.0 22.3 41.7 29.8 38.5 
Entrants aged over 22 12,528 16,191 119 106 341 295 375 276 100 55 573 1,086 1,076 830 
% of entrants aged over 22 12.6 13.8 9.5 8.9 6.5 5.5 11.9 10.7 11.2 7.5 40.8 41.6 54.2 42.0 
Parental social class    
Non-Manual 67.1 67.4 52.5 52.7 48.5 48.4 36.5 36.1 36.3 35.8 52.1 56.4 51.5 54.8 
Manual 25.2 24.6 33.7 33.7 39.5 39.7 39.7 38.2 39.2 38.9 26.9 24.4 20.5 19.3 
Unknown3 7.7 8.0 13.8 13.6 12.1 12.0 23.8 25.8 24.5 25.3 21.0 19.2 28.1 25.9 
Course taken    
Medicine 1.6 1.9 3.5 3.7 7.8 5.1 3.7 3.7 4.5 3.9 0.7 0.5 1.0 1.6 
Science and Engineering 31.3 23.7 32.1 21.6 25.9 22.7 28.3 25.5 31.2 22.1 23.7 17.2 30.2 23.0 
Maths and computing 10.4 2.3 22.6 10.2 25.7 8.9 26.6 7.5 20.3 5.4 15.4 3.5 20.2 9.2 
Business studies 11.1 9.5 11.1 21.3 14.0 16.6 13.6 13.0 13.6 9.6 11.8 9.5 12.9 15.8 
Social Studies 18.1 21.3 13.8 22.3 17.6 26.7 20.2 33.0 22.2 37.5 22.2 32.8 21.8 31.5 
Arts 27.5 41.2 16.8 21.0 9.1 20.1 7.6 17.3 8.3 21.4 26.2 36.6 13.9 18.9 
Table 10 Undergraduate entrants to UK Universities by ethnicity, sex, participation rate, A level point score, parents’ social class and course 
taken 
 
Source UCAS: Entrants to Universities and Colleges in UK, 1998. 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 The vast majority of parents whose social class UCCA classifies as unknown appear to have been unemployed. 
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 Whites Chinese Indians Pakistanis Bangladeshis Afro-Caribs Black Africans 
 Entrants % Entrants % Entrants % Entrants % Entrants % Entrants % Entrants % 
Oxbridge 5,171 2.41 89 3.73 130 1.29 21 0.38 17 1.12 16 0.42 16 0.38 
Civic Universities 68,202 31.84 945 39.62 3,074 30.43 1,527 27.96 487 32.10 667 17.46 847 20.01 
Former Polytechnics 74,486 34.77 997 41.80 6,057 59.96 3,263 59.75 903 59.53 2,747 71.91 3,128 73.91 
Colleges of Higher Education 21,448 10.01 83 3.48 451 4.46 205 3.75 54 3.56 291 7.62 136 3.21 
Colleges and Universities in Wales 3,600 1.68 16 0.67 32 0.32 29 0.53 8 0.53 19 0.50 12 0.28 
Colleges and Universities in Scotland 30,696 14.33 195 8.18 201 1.99 337 6.17 23 1.52 46 1.20 57 1.35 
Table 11 Distribution of undergraduate entrants to UK Universities in 1998 by ethnicity and type of institution 
 
Source UCAS: Entrants to Universities and Colleges in UK, 1998. 
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It is also worth giving close consideration to the kinds of degree courses on which minority students 
are managing to secure places, and here again we find some quite remarkable trends. Given that 
medical colleges routinely set the highest points score before admissions are considered, the fact 
that all sections of the minority population bar the Afro-Caribbeans and the Africans are very 
heavily over-represented in this sphere provides yet more evidence not just of students’ tenacity, but 
of their very considerable success in overcoming the many obstacles which are so routinely strewn 
in their path. Moreover the  strong showing of most groups in Maths and Computing, together with 
their parallel tendency of all groups except the Afro-Caribbeans to avoid “soft” areas such as the 
Arts, provides clear statistical confirmation for the frequent observation that minority students tend 
– most usually with the enthusiastic backing of their parents – to view the opportunities available in 
higher education in strongly instrumental terms. If their parents have moved up through the 
employment market largely on the basis of hard work and entrepreneurial flair, the figures in Table 
10 provides dramatic evidence of how heavily – and how successfully – they are now engaged in 
acquiring the educational qualifications which are a necessary precursor to achieving further 
progress into the upper echelons of the social order. 
 
But despite the extent to which all sections of Britain’s minority population have managed – albeit 
at very varied speeds – to overcome the well-known obstacles to upward mobility which are 
embedded in the British educational system, it must not be forgotten that the Higher Education 
system is itself strongly internally stratified; in this respect the figures in Table 11, which set out the 
distribution of minority students across the various categories of degree-awarding institutions are of 
considerable significance. Above all they show that although the visible minorities are broadly 
over-represented in the system, they are currently much more heavily represented in the former 
Polytechnics than they are in the longer established, and generally much more educationally 
prestigious civic Universities. Hence even if they are disproportionately successful within the 
system as a whole, at an institutional level their status is still one of relative disadvantage.  
 
However it is equally important to emphasise that this is not universally the case. We have already 
noted the disproportionate presence of the minorities in the extremely competitive sphere of 
medicine. What Table 11 also reveals is that although minority students as a whole are still under-
represented at the elite Universities of Oxford and Cambridge – which is hardly surprising vigour 
with which places are competed for, and the two Universities’ reputation for social exclusivity – 
British students of Indian origin are in the midst of cracking that mould, whilst those of Chinese 
origin are best described as having overwhelmed it. Not only do nearly twice the proportion of 
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Chinese University entrants secure places as Oxbridge than is the case amongst the whites, but a 
much higher proportion of young Chinese people enter Higher Education in any event. 
 
5 Making sense of it all: inequality and diversity in polyethnic Britain 
Just how have all these outcomes – whether in terms of the degree of upward mobility through the 
employment market achieved by members of the first generation of migrants, or the equally 
dramatic, and even more varied, educational successes of their British-born offspring – been 
attained? 
5.1 Overcoming adversity 
The ground which the minorities have made up has clearly not been easily gained. As almost every 
Chapter in this Report serves to demonstrate, the obstacles of racial exclusionism are not only a 
routine feature of the contemporary British social order, but they also operate in every conceivable 
institutional context. If the minorities have achieved as much as they have, it is only too clearly 
despite the many handicaps they have encountered, rather than because the established order 
smoothed the paths along which they have advanced. Thus whilst the minorities may indeed have 
sought to make the maximum use of whatever opportunities they were able to identify, their efforts 
to do so were contested at every stage. Hence no matter how successful they may have been in 
overcoming – or at least circumventing – the obstacles they faced, they have had actively to force 
open the gates to every new field they have entered, a process which still continues to this day. 
How, then, have they managed to pull off this feat, given that it is one which has eluded so many 
members – and especially the working-class members – of the more indigenous sections of Britain’s 
population?  
 
One point is immediately clear: nobody has gone out of their way to help them. Although the 
introduction of Race Relations legislation in the mid nineteen sixties certainly provided some 
degree of relief, at least in the sense that it eliminated the overt indications of exclusionism 
(“coloured people need not apply”) which had previously been far from uncommon, it would be idle 
to suggest that such legislation actually halted the practice of exclusionism. Instead it was simply 
driven underground: provided employers avoided the most immediate pitfalls (as their personnel 
departments took care to ensure was done), the prospect of bringing a successful challenge in the 
courts was and remains minimal. Hence if the minorities have achieved as much as they have it is 
overwhelmingly by dint of their own efforts: in a phrase, they have pulled themselves up by their 
own boot-straps. Thanks to an immense amount of hard work, together with an explicit 
acknowledgement that they would be have to be twice as competent, twice as well qualified, twice 
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as entrepreneurial and twice as imaginative as their competitors if they were to beat them at their 
own game, members of the new minorities have indeed managed the obstacles they faced, and 
hence to belie the indigenous majority’s exceedingly limited expectations of their capabilities.  As a 
result they are slowly beginning to penetrate even the most exalted echelons of the British social 
order.  
 
However surprising such developments may seem to some observers, and not least to those 
members of the race relations industry whose world view was – and often still is – predicated 
around the inevitability of black failure (Ballard 1992), it is worth emphasising that success-against 
-the-odds in this sense is in no way an unprecedented phenomenon. To be sure the Jewish 
predecessors of the newer minorities were invisible rather than visible, but nevertheless the 
exclusionary pressures which bore down on the former were clearly just as intense – and certainly 
just as overtly articulated, at least until the horrors of the holocaust began to filter into public 
consciousness – as that now directed at the latter. Nevertheless during the course of little more than 
a century Britain’s Jewish population – and especially its Ashkenasi majority – has managed wholly 
to transform its social status. The immigrants from Eastern Europe who flooded off steamers from 
Hamburg during the closing decades of the nineteenth century immediately found themselves 
pressed into just the same sub-proletarian position as any other group of labour migrants. But now, 
at the end of the twentieth century, their situation could not be more different. Despite all the many 
forms of exclusionism they have encountered along the way, members of Britain’s Jewish 
population – still no more than around a third of a million strong – have pressed their way forward 
so successfully that they clearly hugely over-represented in the upper echelons of the business and 
professional world.  
5.2 The roots of resistance 
Yet just how have Britain’s various minorities set about achieving all this? One point can, of course, 
be made on a wholly a priori basis: if the excluded manage to overcome – or at least to circumvent 
– the  handicaps they face, it necessarily follows that that their success must in some way be 
grounded in the minorities own activities, and more specifically on the resources on which they 
themselves have been able to draw, in resisting their exclusion. But even if we can agree on that, we 
are still left with a further problem. Just what are those what resources? And just how have they 
been utilised to achieve what might otherwise seem to be a quite impossible task? 
 
Insofar as survey data of the kind that has been presented in this Chapter amounts to a statistical 
snapshot of outcomes at a given point in time, it cannot provide us with any direct answers to such 
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qualitative questions: in and of itself quantitative data can only tells us how things are – not how 
and why they have come to be that way. Nevertheless careful analytical reflection of the character 
of those outcomes can begin to provide us with an understanding of the dynamic of the processes 
which have led to these outcomes – especially if we also take the trouble to introduce a more 
qualitative, and more specifically an ethnographic, perspective into our analytical model. But before 
doing that, let us begin by reflecting on the numerical data itself. 
 
Two themes stand out with particular clarity. Firstly that Britain’s visible minorities have, in 
aggregate terms, left the sub-proletarian position to which they were initially consigned far behind 
them. They no longer form an underclass. But secondly, and in many ways even more importantly, 
the minorities also display an immense amount of diversity. Hence in mean terms the difference in 
the levels of achievement of the different sub-sections of the population which we are currently able 
to identify are very much great than that between the minorities as a whole and the majority. How is 
such diversity to be explained? 
5.3 Explaining diversity 
One possibility that is at least worth considering – if only to rule it out – is that the varied 
trajectories of upward mobility which have been highlighted here are the outcome of differential 
reactions of the indigenous majority to different sub-sections of the new minority population. Could 
it be, for example, that the intensity of racial exclusionism is directly proportional to the darkness of 
person’s skin colour, such that black Africans find themselves much more seriously handicapped 
than do brown Asians?  Alternatively, could it be that exclusionism is predicated on the precise 
character of a given minority group’s ethnic distinctiveness, such that Muslims, for example, are 
additionally handicapped as a result of their exposure to Islamophobia?  
 
Whilst explanations of this kind – all of which are predicated around majority reactions to various 
forms of minority distinctiveness, rather minority distinctiveness per se – may seem very plausible 
in principle, careful examination of the numerical data in this Chapter offers very little support for 
such hypotheses. For example if skin colour – or to be more precise the reactions of the not-
coloured majority to varying degrees of skin pigmentation – were the principal determinant of 
differential degrees of upward mobility, we would expect to find a clear gradation from the least 
handicapped Asians to the most handicapped Africans. But no such gradation can be detected. The 
Indians and the Chinese may indeed be the most upwardly mobile, but thus far at least the Indians 
and the Bangladeshis lag far so far behind that they have at least in some senses been overtaken by 
both the Afro-Caribbeans and the Black Africans. Nor is everything straightforward on this latter 
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front: however whilst members of both groups are equally black, African men – especially of the 
first generation – have substantially outperformed their Afro-Caribbean counterparts, the reverse is 
the case for Afro-Caribbean women. Similarly whilst there is plentiful evidence that members of 
Britain’s indigenous majority can easily be swept away by powerful feelings of Islamophobia, and 
although this is clearly congruent with the fact that the Muslim components of the South Asian 
population, namely the Pakistanis and Bangladeshi have as yet achieved much less upward mobility 
than their Indian counterparts, it is extremely difficult to demonstrate that the relationship is causal, 
not least because there is no evidence the most potential discriminators could accurately distinguish 
between Muslims and non-Muslims.  
 
Last but not least it is also worth emphasising that even if there were some merit in explanations of 
this kind, they still could not explain why it is that following an initial period of adjustment and 
consolidation, all sub-sections of the visible minority population have achieved a substantial degree 
of upward mobility. Hence the issue before us is not so much to explain why some groups have 
been successful whilst others have not, but rather how and why different groups have followed such 
strikingly varied trajectories of adaptation. Moreover it is precisely the answers to those questions  
which are most likely to open the way to the most challenging question of all: just what is the secret 
of the minorities’ success?  
5.4 Alterity as a resource 
The broad agenda which we need to follow in doing so should now be clear enough. If racial 
exclusionism is primarily directed at people of colour, regardless of their precise shade of non-
whiteness, and if such exclusionism imposes a broadly similar handicap on all members of the 
visible minorities, it necessarily follows that if different subsections of that population respond to 
exclusionism in differential ways, this can only be explained as an outcome of each group’s own 
specific concatenation of skills, resilience, experiences and resources. Nor is it difficult to identify 
just what these resources might be, especially in the case of immigrant minorities. No matter how 
routinely members of the indigenous majority may overlook such matters, every single migrant 
minority has its own distinctive historical and geographical roots, which in turn have had – and 
continue to have – a powerful impact not just on the specific character of the intellectual, social, 
cultural, religious and material capital which members of each group brought with them to Britain, 
but also on the strategies which they have deployed as they set about devising their own self-
generated strategies of survival in their new an alien environment.  
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Nor is ethnic resistance of this kind a temporary flash in the pan. In so far is racial exclusionism is 
not just a permanent handicap, but one whose impact on the second and subsequent generations is 
even sharper than that experienced by the first generation of immigrants, it constitutes a long-term 
challenge to all members the new minorities. Moreover in meeting that challenge, all sections of 
this population group have begun to develop a similar response: rather than seeking to emulate the 
social and cultural conventions of Britain’s indigenous majority, they have looked, instead, to 
resources of their own alterity as a means of coping with adversity. Hence the vast majority not only 
relied on the reciprocities of their kinship networks to facilitate the immediate challenges of 
migration and resettlement, but on that basis were soon busily engaged in a very active process of 
community building. However the resultant ethnic colonies – whose presence is now such a salient 
feature of the social order in every major industrial city – were not only constructed by people of 
like backgrounds, but precisely because they were organised on their own terms, offered their 
members a powerful alternative source of moral, psychological, strategic and spiritual inspiration on 
the basis of which to devise strategies which would enable them at least to survive – and better still 
to circumvent and to overcome – the exclusionary handicaps with which they were faced.  
 
So it is that no matter how much the members of the indigenous majority assumed – and indeed 
may still assume – that cultural traditions deployed by people of colour were at best misguided and 
at worst oppressively barbaric, and no matter how comprehensively such negative views may be 
entrenched in publicly transmitted ideologies, such ideas have had very little impact on members of 
the minorities themselves. On the contrary they have moved off in precisely the opposite direction. 
By treating their alterity as a positive asset they have not only been able to resist the worst ravages 
of racial and ethnic denigration, but also found a means of developing strategic responses with 
which to confound majority expectations of their inevitable failure.  
 
However these responses have been anything but uniform. Precisely because their success was very 
largely predicated around a failure to conform to majority expectations, members of each of the 
resultant ethnic colonies were (and indeed still are) inspired by the unique – and hence intensely 
varied – features of their own specific moral, linguistic, religious and cultural heritage. But in doing 
so migrants were engaged in a far more complex activity than generating simple carbon copies of 
their prior heritage: rather they were drawn into a richly creative process in which they reinterpreted 
(and where necessary reinvented) familiar ideas, conventions and understandings to meet the many 
and varied challenges which were thrown up in their new environment. As a result these processes 
of ethnic and cultural reconstruction are not only highly adaptive in character, but in no way limited 
solely to the first generation of migrants. Quite the contrary. As the British-born second and third 
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generation emerge into adulthood it is becoming increasingly clear that they are just as actively, and 
in many senses even more inventively, engaged in so doing than their parents.  
 
Set within the context of such developments, the broad pattern of upward mobility displayed by the 
new minorities as a whole, as well as the yet more diverse trajectories of adaptation being followed 
by each of their many component communities not only becomes much more comprehensible, but 
does so in such a way as to puncture one of the most deeply entrenched assumptions of racist 
thought: that people of colour lack the capacity to set – and to successfully pursue – purposeful 
agendas of their own. If that hypothesis were true, the minorities would indeed be reduced to the 
condition of helpless pawns, with their fate being wholly determined by the irresistible forces of 
racial exclusionism. Hence the most important lesson to be learned from this Chapter is that no 
matter how severe the forces of exclusionism may become, the visible minorities – no less than any 
other similarly marginalised group – have remained active agents in their own cause, and as such 
have constantly sought out strategies with which to resist, to circumvent and best off all to confound 
such forces.  
 
Such a perspective also brings with it a radical shift in analytical focus. Rather than being reduce to 
the status of helpless victims seeking slavishly (and of course unsuccessfully) to emulate the goals, 
strategies and tactics of the dominant majority, the minorities begin to spring to life as active agents 
in their own cause, fully capable of revamping the resources of whatever assets they can lay their 
hands on the better to pursue their own self-defined agendas. Given that there is no section of the 
minority population whose members are not engaged in so doing, it should come as no surprise 
whatsoever that their the trajectories of adaptation have become so positive – and so diverse. Nor 
are such outcomes in any way unprecedented. If a example is needed, the dramatic levels of upward 
mobility achieved by members Britain’s Jewish minority during the course of the past century 
provides a particularly clear indicator of just how strategically beneficial access to networks of 
ethnic reciprocity and solidarity can be to members of otherwise marginalised  minorities.  
 
Yet however illuminating such an analytical perspective may be in principle, it still leaves many 
more specific issues unresolved. In the first place it offers few clues as to the precise character of 
the resources on which the minorities have drawn to achieve these outcomes; and secondly it still 
leaves the issue of inter-group differentiation largely unresolved. Whilst this is no place to develop 
comprehensive answers to such conundra, the most salient components of the kind of analysis 
which would enable us to address them more fully can be laid out without too much difficulty.  
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5.5 The assets of alterity: peasant lifestyles and extended kinship networks 
In considering the extent to which the new minorities have overwhelmingly drawn on extra-
European moral, ideological, spiritual and organisational traditions as they set about fashioning  
their strategies of resistance, it is also worth noting a further common characteristic that almost all 
of them share: each of those traditions is also grounded in a rural, and above all a peasant, 
experience. This is also most significant, for no matter how strongly negative a connotation the term 
peasant may have in the contemporary English vernacular, a careful examination of the social and 
cultural conventions characteristic of peasant societies reveals a very different picture: one which 
immediately illuminates the ideas, assumptions and strategies which have been so crucial to the new 
minorities’ mould-breaking trajectories of upward mobility.  
 
Although many observers have commented on the apparently ‘middle class’ outlook of members of 
the most successful components of the new minority population, that label is in fact highly 
misleading. To be sure the offspring of professionally qualified migrants have performed 
exceptionally well in the British educational system; but at the same time it must also be 
remembered that such people only made up a very small minority of the total inflow, and that 
amongst the Indians and the Chinese in particular, the children of non-professional migrants – or in 
other words those of peasant origins – are performing almost as well as those of professional 
parentage.  
 
How has this come about? Rather than trying to explain such outcomes by shoe-horning peasants 
into the more familiar category ‘middle-class’, it is far more appropriate to focus in on the specific 
kinds of values and behaviours which are cultivated within such societies. Amongst other things 
peasants everywhere invariably exhibit a strong commitment frugal living, and hence to economic 
self-reliance in order to avoid the demeaning condition of dependency invariably precipitated by 
debt, are masters of long term financial planning, given that this has to stretch at the very least from 
harvest to harvest, accompanied by a routine expectation that the best route prerequisite to 
collective security – and hence prosperity – is through the mobilisation of the resources of the entire 
extended family, most especially since they also start from the premise that no-one is going to help 
them but themselves. But however much those who operate in those terms may be dismissed as 
rural backwoodsmen by educated urbanites, it is now becoming increasingly obvious that such 
lifestyles are at least as adaptive to urban industrial contexts as they were in the rural environments 
where they were first devised.   So it is that no matter how much such possibilities are routinely 
overlooked in post-peasant societies, the plain fact is that peasant modes of behaviour have an 
immensely great adaptive potential than those found in the more unskilled sections of Britain’s 
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indigenous working class. Amongst the latter several generations of proletarian dependency on a 
weekly wage packet, reinforced by ever more intense exposure to the illusory temptations of credit-
led consumer capitalism has not only almost completely overwhelmed the more frugal assumptions 
of their long-departed rural ancestors, but in so doing almost entirely eroded their capacity for 
autonomous thought and action, and with that both the confidence and the ability to challenge the 
subordinate positions into which the wider social order so efficiently directs them. Viewed from this 
perspective, it comes as no surprise whatsoever that members of virtually all sections of the new 
minorities should so rapidly have performed the kind of escape-trick which has so for long eluded 
that section of the indigenous working class who initially appeared to be their peers. So it is that 
whilst the visible minorities (no less than their less visible predecessors) may initially have formed 
an excluded sub-proletariat, it is precisely through the resourceful utilisation of their alternative 
cultural traditions that they have been able to pull off – much to the bewilderment of many 
observers – the feats of upward mobility outlined in this Chapter.  
 
Nevertheless this analysis still leaves one very pressing question untouched. If the cultural capital 
associated with migrants’ peasant origins is the key to these developments, how are the high levels 
of inter-community diversity – both in the trajectories of adaptation which have been followed, and 
the speed with which they have been traversed – to be explained? On the face of it such varied 
outcomes cannot be explained if members of every group were drawing on broadly similar assets. 
 
Whilst that would indeed be so if migrants of peasant origin formed a homogeneous social category, 
it is only too clear that that is not the case. In the first place a full analysis needs to take cognisance 
of a range of crucial intervening variables, such as the level of economic development in each group 
of migrants’ home base immediately prior to their departure, the speed at which they chose (or were 
able) to reunite their families, such that their children were able to begin to take advantage of the 
British educational system, and the economic fate of the specific niche in the British economy 
which each group initially chose to exploit, all of which have had a far-reaching impact on the 
trajectories of settlement, adaptation and mobility which specific communities have followed 
(Ballard 1991). However as Ballard shows in the course of so arguing, a further set of variables is 
now proving to have an even more far reaching impact: the precise characteristics of each group’s 
kinship system, which in turn largely determine both the form of, and the quality of the internal 
dynamics generated within, the structures and networks of mutual reciprocity which members of 
each group have constructed around themselves since their arrival.  
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To find that issues of kinship should loom so large within communities of peasant origin is no way 
a cause for surprise: not only do a complex set of kinship conventions invariably provide the 
foundations around which peasant agriculturalists construct the greater part of their social world, 
but the value of these resources becomes particularly salient in conditions of severe adversity. Yet if 
kinship is to peasants as horses are to carts, the actual content of those kinship conventions, and 
hence the character of the social networks they generate, is extremely varied.  
 
Hence whilst some communities, such as the Cantonese (Watson 19**) and the Punjabi Sikhs 
(Kessinger 1975), may support heavily extended and strongly corporate descent groups, those found 
within others, such as the Sylhetis (Gardner 1995) descent groups may be much shallower more 
loosely organised; in some communities, such as the Gujarati Hindus, marriage transactions are not 
only caste-endogamous but also governed by elaborate rules of clan exogamy, with the result that 
any given family’s affinal ties spread out over a wide geographical arena (Pocock 1972), whilst in 
others a strong preference for marriage with close kin, as for instance amongst the Mirpuris (Ballard 
1990) precipitates precisely the opposite outcome; and whilst most peasant traditions are strongly 
patrilineal in character, others – and those found amongst rural Afro-Caribbean are a dramatic case 
in point (Driver 19**) – produce much more strongly matrilateral and hence matrifocal outcomes.  
 
Unfortunately there is no space here actively to explore just how such qualitative differences have 
led all the many different components of Britain’s visible minority populations to follow such 
dramatically varied trajectories of adaptation and mobility, so precipitating that widely varying 
quantitative outcomes which have been highlighted in this Chapter. Nevertheless two points should 
by now be very clear. Given that their imported cultural capital has been one of the key resources 
on which members of all migrant minorities have drawn, it was only to be expected that variations 
in the precise character of that capital – no matter how arcane some of those variations may still 
seem culturally ill-attuned observers – would have a far-reaching impact on each group’s trajectory 
of adaptation.  Secondly, and just as importantly, it should also be remembered that these 
trajectories are on-going processes, of which there is still much more in the pipeline. Hence, for 
example, whilst surveys may repeatedly demonstrate that Sylheti Bangladeshis constitute one of the 
poorest of Britain’s minority communities, partly because of their overwhelming reliance on the 
low-waged and allegedly ‘dead-end’ restaurant trade, and partly because only a very small minority 
of Sylheti women are currently economically active (Modood et. al. 1997), it would be quite wrong 
to conclude that the Sylhetis are bound to remain at the bottom of the pile. After all whilst the 
Chinese were equally heavily concentrated in the fast-food trade only a generation ago, their 
children are now achieving higher levels of educational success than anyone else. Moreover as the 
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rising generation of British-born Sylheti women emerge into adulthood with even better academic 
qualifications than their brothers, the current pattern of non-involvement in the waged labour 
market is most unlikely to last for very much longer. In South Asian contexts Bengalis have a long 
standing – and in many respects well-merited – reputation for intellectual excellence. With this in 
mind there is no reason why the currently much pitied Sylhetis should not eventually turn out to be 
Britain’s new Chinese.  
6 Conclusion 
Last but not least it is also worth giving brief consideration to the consequences of these 
developments for social policy in general. If the exploitation of the resources of their cultural 
alterity has had such a far reaching – and so positive – effect on the minorities’ progress through 
both the employment market and the educational system, it is only to be expected that they will 
continue to deploy such strategies for the foreseeable future; if so, it also follows that the condition 
of cultural pluralism thereby engendered must be regarded as a permanent feature of the British 
social order, and that this will have an equally far reaching impact in all sorts of spheres besides 
those on which this Chapter focuses.  
 
To the extent that members of all of Britain’s minority communities are continuing to sustain a 
large measure of religious, cultural, moral and linguistic distinctiveness in personal and domestic 
contexts – if only because they find it so strongly advantageous to do so – then it also follows that 
the resultant condition of cultural plurality generates all sorts of challenges to the organisation and 
delivery of public services, and most especially when those services impinge in some way on their 
recipients’ personal and domestic lives. No less than police officers, all manner of other public 
services professionals, be they doctors, health visitors, psychiatrists, judges, lawyers, probation or 
prison officers, teachers or social workers now find themselves facing a whole series of challenges 
for which – as the Macpherson report has emphasised, they are currently almost completely 
unprepared.  
 
Unless and until all these professions take much more explicit cognisance of the increasingly plural 
character of Britain’s contemporary social order, and until they take institutional initiatives to 
overcome the systemic problems identified by the Macpherson report – not least by ensuring that 
their members develop sufficient cultural competence to deliver as professionally effective services 
to those who of their clients who differ as they do to clients drawn from the indigenous majority – 
the minorities will continue to view established professional practices as constituting a very 
significant portion of the exclusionary handicaps which still stand in their way. 
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